Nic Carter Warns Bitcoin Faces a Near-Term Quantum Threat
Nic Carter argues Bitcoin must urgently prepare for quantum computing, warning the threat may arrive far sooner than expected.
Crypto Laddin
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One of the most intense debates currently unfolding in the Bitcoin ecosystem centers on quantum computing and its potential impact on Bitcoin’s security. At the heart of this discussion is prominent Bitcoin investor and commentator Nic Carter, who has reignited the conversation with a series of widely read blog posts and public statements.
Carter’s position is not controversial in its premise—most experts agree that sufficiently advanced quantum computers will eventually be capable of breaking Bitcoin’s current cryptography. What makes his argument stand out is timing. According to Carter, the threat is not decades away but could realistically emerge between 2028 and 2033.
Bitcoin relies on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), a system widely used across global financial infrastructure. However, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued draft guidance recommending that quantum-vulnerable cryptographic systems be phased out by 2030. Carter views this as a critical warning signal for Bitcoin developers.
Another factor accelerating the timeline is capital. Carter points to billions of dollars flowing into quantum computing research in 2025 alone, fueled by both private investment and government-backed institutions. He also emphasizes the close relationship between AI research and quantum development, arguing that advances in artificial intelligence are indirectly speeding up breakthroughs in quantum computing.
Perhaps the most compelling element of Carter’s argument is the economic incentive. Bitcoin wallets with exposed public keys—most notably those believed to belong to Satoshi Nakamoto—represent a massive prize. At current market prices, Carter estimates that roughly $600 billion worth of BTC could be vulnerable. For a successful quantum research team, this would be the largest financial bounty in history.
Carter believes this incentive dramatically increases the likelihood that quantum capabilities capable of breaking ECC will arrive sooner rather than later. As a result, he argues that Bitcoin cannot afford complacency.
The only viable defense, in his view, is a protocol upgrade to post-quantum signature schemes, which would likely require a coordinated fork. Carter estimates that designing, debating, implementing, and testing such changes could take two to three years, making immediate action essential.
He also rejects the idea that quantum-vulnerable coins should simply be treated as “lost” and removed from economic consideration. Instead, Carter insists that the Bitcoin community must openly decide how to handle these assets through consensus and careful planning.
Carter’s core message is clear: quantum risk is no longer a distant theoretical concern. If Bitcoin wants to preserve its long-term security and credibility, discussions and development must begin now—not later.